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Article 2

THE DEBT O1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW TO NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS*
Ancient Chinese philosophers were wont to distinguish
the passive and active elements of Being, called respectively
Yin and Yang. If I may be permitted -to employ this locution for a moment, the "yang" element of American Constitutional Law is Judicial Review, the power, and corresponding duty of a court to pass upon the validity of
legislative acts in relation to a higher law which is regarded
as being binding on both the legislature and the court. By
the same token the "yin" element is the aforesaid higher
law. Today this role is ordinarily filled by a constitutional
document, the Constitution of the United States being the
supreme example; but earlier, Natural Law or. some derivative concept took the part of "yin." Hence the purpose of
this discourse - which is to demonstrate how very large
a part of its content American Constitutional Law has always owed, and still owes, to its Natural Law genesis. As
the matrix of American Constitutional Law, the documentary Constitution is still, in important measure, Natural
Law under the skin.
Of "Natural Law" there is no end of definitions, as a
casual examination of Sir Thomas Erskine Holland's Elements of Jurisprudence suffices to show. I venture to quote
a few passages from the 13th edition:'
Aristotle fully recognizes the existence of a natural as well
as of a legal Justice. He mentions as an ordinary device of
rhetoric the distinction which may be drawn between the written law, and "the common law" which is in accordance with
Nature and immutable.
The Stoics were in the habit of identifying Nature with
Law in the higher sense, and of opposing both of these terms
*Originally delivered as an address at the Third Annual Natural Law Institute,
College of Law, University of Notre Dame, December 9, 1949.
1 HOLLAND, ELEiENTS Or JURISPRUDENCE 32-4 (13th ed. 1924).
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to Law which is such by mere human appointment. "Justice,"
they say, "is by Nature and not by imposition." "It proceeds
from Zeus and the common Nature."
The same view finds expression in the Roman lawyers.
"Law," says Cicero, "is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands those things which ought to be done
and prohibits the reverse." "The highest law was born in all
the ages before any law was written or State was formed."
.. "We are by Nature inclined to love mankind, which is the
foundation of law." . . .
S. Thomas Aquinas: "Participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur."
Grotius: "Jus naturale est dictatum rectae rationis. .

For our -purposes it is not essential to choose nicely
among these definitions of what Cicero and St. Thomas call
lex naturalis and Grotius terms jus naturale. We are con-

cerned only with certain juristic connotations of the concept: first, that Natural Law is entitled by its intrinsic excellence to prevail over any law which rests solely on human
authority; second, that Natural Law may be appealed to
by human beings against injustices sanctioned by human
authority.
I.
NaturalLaw Into NaturalRights.
In a famous passage in the Rhetoric, Aristotle advised
advocates that when they had "no case according to the law
of the land," they should "appeal to the law of nature," and,
quoting the Antigone of Sophocles, argue that "an unjust
law is not a law." 2 While this advice scarcely reveals any
deep devotion on Aristotle's part to the Natural Law concept, it does evidence the short step, which even at that
date existed in men's minds, between the concept and the
idea of a juridicalrecourse to it. Three hundred years later
we find Cicero in his De Legibus contrasting "summa lex"
and "lex scripta"; "summum jus" and "jus civile"; "uni2

Id. at 32 n.4.
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versum jus" and "jus civile"; and on one occasion appealing in the Senate to "recta ratio" against the "lex scripta." 3

It was during the Middle Ages, however, that the conception of Natural Law as a code of human rights first took
on real substance and importance. This was so even on the
Continent,4 albeit institutions were lacking there through
which such ideas could be rendered effective practically. In
England, on the other hand, this lack was supplied by the
royal courts, administering the Common Law. The impregnation of the Common Law with higher law concepts proceeded
rapidly in the Fourteenth Century under Edward III. Of
the thirty-two royal confirmations of the Charter noted by
Sir Edward Coke, fifteen occurred in this reign; and near
the end of it, in 1368, to the normal form of confirmation
the declaration was added by statute that any statute passed
contrary to Magna Carta "soit tenuz p'nul," words which
seem clearly to have been addressed to the royal officials, including the judges.'
Here, to be sure, Magna Carta fills the role of Natural
Law, but it is a Magna Carta already infused with Natural
Law content, as is shown by Bracton's earlier designation
of Chapter 29 as "constitutio libertatis"; and in the Fifteenth Century the "lex naturae" has completely replaced
"Magna Carta" in the juristic equation. This is notably so,
for example, in the pages of Fortescue's famous In Praise
of the Law of England (De Laudibus Legum Angliae),
which was but one of many similar encomia. As Father
Figgis has written of this period:6
The Common Law is pictured invested with a halo of dignity peculiar to the embodiment of the deepest principles and
to the highest expression of human reason and of the law of
nature implanted by God in the heart of man. As yet men are
3 Id. at 33 n.6; see also, the present writer's book, CoRwN, LIBERTY
AGAiNsT GOVENsarmUT 15-7 (1948), and accompanying notes.
4 See GzaE, POLITICAL Tnxomus OF THE MIDDLE AGES 80-1 (Maitland's
trans. 1927).
5

The preceding sentence is taken from CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 26.

6 As quoted in CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 28.
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not clear that an Act of Parliament can do more than declare
the Common Law. It is the Common Law which men set up as
an object of worship. The Common Law is the perfect ideal
of law; for it is natural reason developed and expounded by
a collective wisdom of many generations.

.

. Based on long

usage and almost supernatural wisdom, its authority is above,
rather than below that of Acts of Parliament or royal ordinances, which owe their fleeting existence to the caprice of the
King or to the pleasure of councillors, which have a merely
material sanction and may be repealed at any moment.

Thus the Common Law becomes higher law, without at all
losing its quality as positive law, the law of the King's courts
and of the rising Inns of Court. Nor does Fortescue fail to
stress its dual character. Asserting the identity of "perfect
justice" with "legal justice," and the subordination of the
King to the law, i.e., the law courts, he proceeds to counsel
his Prince as follows: 7
. . . there will be no occasion for you to search into the
arcana of our laws with such tedious application and study...
It will not be convenient by severe study, or at the expense
of the best of your time, to pry into nice points of law: such
matters may be left to your judges and counsel. .. ; furthermore, you will pronounce judgment in the courts by others
than in person, it being not customary for the Kings of England to sit in court or pronounce judgment themselves
(proprio ore nullus regum Angliae judichim projerre uses est).
I know very well the quickness of your apprehension and the
forwardness of your parts; but for that expertness in the laws
which is requisite for judges the studies of twenty years
(viginti annorum lucubrationes) barely suffice.

In short, Natural Law has become a craft mystery - the
mystery of Bench and Bar - what it has remained, now in
greater, now in less measure ever since.
A century and a half later we find Lord Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, describing a scene 8 which reads
like a re-enactment of that imagined by Fortescue. But to
his predecessor's work of edification, Coke adds official recognition that judicial custodianship of the Common Law signi7 Id. at 30.
8 12 Rep. 63-65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1341-1343 (1609).
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fies the power and duty of the law courts to apply its measure
both to the Royal Prerogative and to the power of Parliament. The latter claim appears in his famous "dictum," socalled, in Dr. Bonham's Case,9 which reads:"0
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament
is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it
and adjudge such Act to be void....

And this was said, it should be noted, at the end of a century in which the thesis of Parliament's absolute power to
alter and abrogate any -and all laws had been asserted again
and again; 1 and not only asserted but demonstrated by its
part in the Tudor ecclesiastical and religious revolution.
Eighty years after Dr. Bonham's Case, "The great Mr.
Locke" produced his second Treatise on Civil Government,
in which the dissolution of Natural Law into the natural
rights of the individual - -the rights of "life, liberty and
estate" - is completed through the agency of the Social
Compact. Of judicial review, to be sure, Locke appears to
have no inkling. He relied for the protection of the individual's inherent and inalienable rights on: first, Parliament;
second, the right of revolution. Even so, Locke's contribution to both the doctrinal justification of judicial review and
to the theory of its proper scope is first and last a very considerable one.
Coke and Locke are 'the two great names in the common
Anglo-American higher law tradition, and the contribution
of each is enhanced by that of the other. Locke's version
of Natural Law not only rescues Coke's version of the English constitution from a localized patois, restating it in the
universal tongue of the Eighteenth Century, it also supplements it in important respects. Coke's endeavor was to put
9 8 Rep. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
1o Id., 8 Rep. at 118a; see also Proclamations, 12 Rep. 74, 77 Eng. Rep.
1352 (1611).
11 See CoRwN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32-3 and notes.
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forward the historical procedures of the Common Law as a
permanent restraint on power, and especially on the power
of the English crown. Locke, in the limitations which he
imposes on legislative power, is looking rather to the security
of the substantive rights of the individual - those rights
which are implied in the basic arrangements of society at
all times and in all places. While Coke extricated the notion
of fundamental law from what must sooner or later have
proved a fatal nebulosity, he did so at the expense of archaism. Locke, on the other hand, in cutting loose -ingreat measure from -the historical method of reasoning, opened the way
to the larger issues with which American Constitutional Law
has been called upon to grapple in its latest maturity. 2
II.
NaturalLaw and JudicialReview
The Ions et origo of both the doctrine and the practice of
judicial review in the United States is Coke's invocation in
Dr. Bonham's Case of "common right and reason," which as
explained by the Sixteenth Century author of Doctor and
Student, was the term used "by them that be learned in the
laws of England" in place of the term "law of nature." is
Commended by two Lord Chief Justices, Hobart and Holt,
the dictum had won repeated recognition in various legal
abridgments and digests before the outbreak of the American Revolution. 4 In the early 1700's it was relied on by a
British colonial law officer as affixing the stigma of invalidity
to an act of the Barbadoes assembly creating paper money." 5
In 1759, we encounter a casual reference by Governor Cadwalader Colden of the Province of New York to "a judicial
power of declaring them [laws] void." 16
12

Parts of the above paragraph are taken from CoRwIN, op. cit. supra note

3, at 50-1.

13 See CoawIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 35; Id. at n.40.
14 Id. at 39 n.43.
15

See II CiAL=, OPINIONS o' EMINENT LAWYERS 27-38 (1814).

16 II N. Y. HISTL. SocIETy COLLCTIONS 204; see also, CHAx.ias, Poutical
Annals in I N. Y. HIST'L. Socr.n COLLECTIoNs 81 (1868).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

But just as Coke had forged his celebrated dictum as a
possible weapon for the struggle which he already foresaw
against the divine rights pretensions of James I, so its definitive reception in this country was motivated by the rising
agitation against the Mother Country. The creative first
step was taken by James Otis in February, 1761, in his argument for the Boston merchants against an application by a
British customs official for a general warrant authorizing
him to search their cellars and warehouses for smuggled
goods. An act of Parliament "against natural Equity," Otis
asserted,-was void. "If an Act of Parliament," he continued,
"should be made in the very Words of this Petition, it would
be void," and it would be the duty of the executive courts
to pass it "into disuse." '" Four years later, according to
Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts, the prevailing argument against the Stamp Act was that it was "against
Magna Charta and .the natural rights of Englishmen, and
therefore, according to Lord Coke, null and void," testimony
which is borne out by a contemporaneous deoision of a Virginia county court."8 On -the very eve of the Declaration of
Independence, Judge William Cushing, later to become one
of Washington's appointees to the original bench of the Supreme Court, charged a Massachusetts jury to ignore certain acts of Parliament as "void and inoperative" and was
congratulated by John Adams for doing so. 9
And meantime, in 1772, George Mason had developed a
similar argument against an act of the Virginia assembly of
1682, under which certain Indian women had been sold into
slavery. The act in question, he asserted, "was originally void
of itself, because contrary to natural right." '0 And, he continued:21
17 Adams' report of Otis' argument in Paxton's Case, Quincy (App. I) 474
(Mass. 1761).
18 Quincy (App. I) 519 n.13 (Mass. 1761).
19

V MCMASTER, HISTORY oF THE PEOP.E OF THE UNITED STATES 395 (1905).

20

Robin v. Hardaway, Jeff. 109 (Va. 1772).
Id. at 114.

21
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If natural right, independence, defect of representation,
and disavowal of protection, are not sufficient to keep them
from the coercion of our laws, on what other principles can
we justify our opposition to some late acts of power exercised
over us by the British legislature? Yet they only pretended
to impose on us a paltry tax in money; we on our free neighbors, the yoke of perpetual slavery. Now all acts of legislature
apparently contrary to natural right and justice, are, in our
laws, and must be in the nature of things, considered as void.
The laws of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can
be superseded by no power on earth... All human constitutiofns which contradict his laws, we are in conscience bound to
disobey. Such have been the adjudications of our courts of
justipe.

Mason concluded by citing Coke and Hobart. The court ad-

judged the act of 1682 repealed.22
Nor did the establishment of the first American constitutions cause this course of reasoning to be abandoned. To the
contrary, the most eminent judges of the first period of
American Constitutional Law, which comes to an end approximately with the death of Marshall in 1835, appealed
freely to natural rights and the social compact as liiniting
legislative power, and based decisions on this ground, and
the same doctrine was urged by the greatest lawyers of the
period without reproach. Typical in this connection is the
case of Wilkinson v. Leland,23 which was decided by the Supreme-Court in 1829. Attorney for the defendants in error
was Daniel Webster. "If," said he, "at this period there is
not a general restraint on Legislatures in favor of private
rights, there is an end to private property. Though there
may be no prohibition in the constitution, the Legislature is
restrained . . . from acts subverting the great principles of
republican liberty and of -the social compact... ,,24 To this

contention his opponent William Wirt responded thus: "Who
is -the sovereign ... ? Is it not the Legislature of the State,
and are not its acts effectual ... unless they come in con22
23
24

Id. at 114, 123.
2 Pet. 627, 7 L. Ed. 542 (1829).
Id., 2 Pet. at 646.
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taot with the great principles of the social compact?" 2
The act of the Rhode Island legislature under review was
upheld, but said Justice Story speaking for the Court: "That
government can scarcely be deemed to be free where the
rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will
of 'alegislative body without any restraint. The fundamental
maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights
of personal liberty and private property should be held
sacred." 2 6 Indeed, fourteen years before this the same Court
had unanimously held void, on the basis of these same principles, an act of the Virginia legislature which purported to
revoke a grant of land.2 7
In short, judicial review initially had nothing to do with
a written constitution. In point of fact, the first appearance
of the idea of judicial review in this country antedated the
first written constitution by at least two decades. Judicial
review continued, moreover, in a relationship of semi-independence of 'the written constitution on the basis of "common right and reason," Natural Law, natural rights, and
kindred postulates throughout the first third of the Nineteenth Century. But meantime, a competing conception of
judicial review as something anchored to the written constitution 'had been in the process of formulation in answer
to Bl'ackstone's doctrine that in every State there is a supreme, absolute power, and that this power is vested in the
legislature. From this angle judicial review based on "common right and reason," or on Natural Law ideas, was an impertinence, as Blackstone itook pains to point out in his
Commentaries.28 But suppose that the supreme will in the
State was not embodied in the legislature and its acts, but in
the people at large and their constitution - what conclusions would follow from -this premise? In The Federalist,
No. 78, Hamilton suggested an answer to this question, and
25
26
27
28

Id., 2 Pet. at 652.
Id., 2 Pet. at 657.
Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 3 L. Ed. 650 (1815).
1 BL. Comm. *46, 91.
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in 1803, in Marbury v. Madison,29 Chief Justice Marshall
elaborated the answer: it is the duty of courts when confronted with a conflict between an act (i.e., a statute) of
"the mere agents of the people" (that is, of the ordinary
legislature) and the act of the people themselves (to wit,
the constitution), to prefer 'the latter.
The inevitable clash between the two conceptions of judicial re#iew was first unfolded in the case of Calder v. Bull, 0
decided by the Supreme Court in 1798. There it was held
that the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, section 10 of the
Constitution applied only to penal legislation and hence
did not protect rights of property and contract from interference by a state legislature; but Justice Samuel Chase endeavored to soften this blow to proprietarian interests by
citing the power of the state courts to enforce extra-constitutional limitations on legislative power, such as many of
them were in fact already doing. Said he: 31
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state Legislature, or that it is absolute and without controul; although its
authority should not be expressly restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law, of the state ... There are certain

vital principles in our free Republican governments, which
will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of
legislative power . . . The genius, the nature, and the spirit
of our state governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts
of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason

forbid them.

To hold otherwise, it was stated, would be "political heresy,
altogether inadmissible." 32
Chase belonged to -the older generation of American lawyers and had been brought up on Coke-Littleton, having received much of his legal education in London in the Inns of
Court. Alongside him on the Supreme Bench, however, sat
a very different type of Rawyer, one of "that brood of young
30
31

Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
3 DaHl. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798).
Id., 3 Dall. at 387-9.

32

Ibid.

29

1
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lawyers," characterized by Jefferson as "ephemeral insects
of the law," who had imbibed their law from Blackstone's
Commentaries. This was James Iredell of North Carolina,
who demurred strongly to Chase's natural rights doctrine.
"True," said he, "some speculative jurists" had held "that a
legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be
void;" but the correct view, he stated, was that:3 3
If...
a government, composed of legislative, executive and
judicial departments, were established, by a Constitution,
which imposed no limits on the legislative power . . .whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully
enacted, and the judicial power, could never interpose to pronounce it void . . . Sir William Blackstone, having put the
strong case of an act of parliament, which should authorize a
man to try his own cause, explicitly adds, that even in that
case, "there is no court that has power to defeat the intent
of the legislature when couched in such evident ... words...."

The debate thus begun was frequently renewed in other
jurisdictions; and long before the Civil War, Iredell had
won the fight - but as we shall see, more in appearance
than in reality. In 1868 Judge Cooley, in considering the
circumstances in which a legislative enactment may be declared unconstitutional, wrote:"
The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except where the constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute,
whether it operate according to natural justice or not in any
particular case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights
of the people of the State, except as those rights are secured
by some constitutional provision which comes within the
judicial cognizance.

Yet, six years later we find the Supreme Court of the
United States pronouncing a statute of the State of Kansas
void on the very grounds that had been laid down in Chase's
dictum. Speaking for an all but unanimous Court, Justice
Miller said: 3
33

Id., 3 Dall. at 398-9.

34

COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS 168 (3d

35

ed. 1874).
Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 662, 22 L. Ed.

455 (1874).
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It must be conceded 'that there are . . . rights in every
free government beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized no such rights, which held the lives,
the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject to all times
to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the
most democratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the many, of the majority,
if you choose to call it so, but it is none the less a despotism.
It may well be doubted if a man is to hold all that he is accustomed to call his own, all in which he has placed his happiness, and the security of which is essential to that happiness,
under the unlimited dominion of others, whether it is not
wiser that this power should be exercised by one man than
by many.

One Justice dissented, asserting that such views tended to
"convert the government into a judicial despotism." 11
But vastly more important is the fact that in -the very
process of discarding the doctrine of natural rights and adherent doctrines as the basis of judicial review, the courts
have contrived to throw about those rights which originally

owed their protection to these doctrines the folds of the
documentary constitution. In short, things are not always
what they seem to be, even when they seem so most." The
indebtedness of the institution of judicial review and of the
rights protected by it to Natural LTw ideas is by no means
sufficiently summed up in the glib statement that nowadays
judicial review is confined to the four corners of the written
constitution.
III.

How Natural Law Doctrines Were Used To Fill A Gap
In The Written Constitution
It is a commonplace that the doctrine of natural rights
was conveyed into the American written Constitution by
bills of rights, the earliest example of which was the Virginia Declaration of Rights of June 12, 1776. This commonId., 20 Wall. at 669.
See, e.g., CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 34, at 174-6, where the principle of
the separation of powers is made to do duty for Natural Law concepts.
36
37
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place is, however, only a half of the truth, and indeed the
lesser half. As has been indicated, the type of judicial review which stemmed from Coke's dictum supplied a second
avenue for natural rights concepts into the constitutional
document. In this section I shall first illustrate this proposition with the doctrine of vested rights.
Not all the early state constitutions were accompanied
by bills of rights. Moreover, the availability of such bills of
rights as existed as a basis for judicial inquiry into the
validity of legislative measures was sharply challenged at
times. Even more important was the fact that, as it came
early to be appreciated, Nil of rights or no bill of rights, the
early state constitutions left proprietarian interests in a very
exposed position vis a vis the new popular assemblies, for
which the prerogatives of the British Parliament itself were
sometimes claimed. 8
The formidable character of legislative power in these
early instruments of government as regards the property
interest, was exhibited in more ways than one. In the first
place, in the prevailing absence of courts of equity, legislative assemblies interfered almost at will with judicial decisions, and particularly those involving disputes over property. The case of Cadler v. Bull, 9 mentioned earlier, affords
an example of this sort of -thing.The Connecticut courts, having refused 'to probate a certain will, were to all intents and
purposes ordered to revise their decision, which they did,
with the result that the heirs at law to an estate were ousted,
after a year and a half of possession, by the beneficiaries of
the will. A second and highly impressive proof of early state
legislative power is afforded by the ferocious catalogue of
legislation directed against the Tories, embracing acts of
confiscation, bills of pains and penalties, even acts of at38 See COXE, AN ESSAY ON JUIDICrAL POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 223 et seq. (1893); V HAMILTON, WORRS 116 (Lodge ed. 1904); VII id.

at 198.
39 Note 30 supra.
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tainder. One sample of such legislation came under the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court in 1800, in the
case of Cooper v. Telfair.4 ° Said Justice Washington: "The
constitution of Georgia does not expressly interdict the
passing of an act of attainder and confiscation... The presumption, indeed, must always be in favor of the validity
of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated." 41 On
this ground and one or two others, the Georgia act was sustained, although Justice Chase opined that with the Federal
Constitution now in effeot such an act would be clearly
void; but this act was passed during the Revolution. Thirdly, with the general collapse of values early in 1780, every
state legislature became a scene of vehement agitation on
the part of the widespread farmer-debtor class in favor of
paper money laws and other measures of like intent. For
the first -time, the property interest was confronted with
"the power of numbers," and, in the majority of cases, the
power of numbers triumphed.
Could the state bills of rights withstand the flood? It soon
transpired that they were an utterly ineffective bulwark of
private rights against state legislative power. And so the
movement was launched which led to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. That abuse by the state legislatures of
their powers had been the most important single cause leading to the Convention was asserted by Madison early in the
course of its deliberations, and others agreed.4 2 So far as we
are concerned, the most important expression of the Convention's anxiety to clip the wings of the high-flying local
sovereignties is to be found in the opening paragraph of section 10 of Article I, which reads:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money,
emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver
40 4 Dall. 14, 1 L. Ed. 721 (1800).
41 Id., 4 Dall. at 18.
42 See I FARarm, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 48, 133-34, 255,
424, 525, 533; II id. at 285 (1937).
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Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law or Law impairing the Obligation of

Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

The provision which here claims attention is the prohibition of ex post facto laws. What did those who urged their
insertion in the Constitution think these words meant? Some
of them, we know, thought the clause would rule out all "retrospective" legislation, meaning thereby -legislation which
operated detrimentally upon existing property rights.4" But
as we have seen in Calder v. Bull, the clause was confined to
penal legislation, to statutes making criminal an act which
was innocent when done. That the Court was thoroughly
aware of the breach it was thus creating in the Constitution,
the opinions of all the Justices, except that of the Blackstonian Iredell, make amply apparent; and going beyond
apology, Chase sought ,toshow how the gap could be stopped
by the local judiciaries by recourse to extra-constitutional
limitations, "the spirit of our free republican governments,"
"the social compact," considerations of "natural justice,"
and the like. The local judiciaries responded to the suggestion with varying degrees of alacrity, and the sum total of
their efforts was one -of the most fertile doctrines of American Constitutional Law, the doctrine of vested rights, the
practical purport of which was that the effect of legislation
on existing property rights was a primary test of its validity,
and that by this test legislation must stop short of curtailing existing rights of ownership, at least unduly or unreasonably.4"
But in fact, Chase's dictum. only stimulated a movement
already begun. Three years prior to Calder v. Bull, we find
Justice Paterson charging a federal jury in a case involving
vested rights in these words: 4
. . . the right of acquiring and possessing property and
having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent and un43

On this point see Coawne, op. dt. supra note 3, at 60-1 n.4.

44

Id. at 72 et seq.

45

Vantorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 310, 1 L. Ed. 391 (1795).
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alienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to
their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the
objects, that induced them to unite in society . . . The preservation of property . . . is a primary object of the social
compact, and, by the late constitution of Pennsylvania, was
made a fundamental law.

Indeed, a majority of the cases of judicial review after the
Cokian model, referred to in Section II of this paper, involved property rights. Nor should the great name of Chancellor Kent be overlooked in this connection. First as judge,
then as Chancellor in his home state, and finally as author
of the famed Commentaries, Kent developed -thedoctrine's
fullest possibilities and spread its influence fastest and farthest.
Yet even as Kent was vaunting private property as an
instrument of God for realizing his plans for the advancement of -the race, it was becoming less and less practicable
to urge such considerations on American judges. The oldtype Cokian judge had about disappeared - Blackstone was
in the saddle in the law offices and in the court houses. What
is more, with the accession of Jackson to the Presidency
there took place an immense resurgence of the doctrine of
popular sovereignty. Of the numerous corollaries into which
the doctrine proliferated, two are relevant to our interest:
first, the Constitution was an ordinance of the people, and
its supremacy sprang from the fact that it embodied their
will; second, of the three departments of state government, the legislature stood nearest the people. It followed
that -the courts had better go slow in holding state legislative acts invalid; and that on no account must they do so
except for a plain violation of the Constitution, i.e., of the
people's will as there expressed.
Bench and Bar were confronted with a dilemma: either
they must cast the doctrine of vested rights to the wolves
or they must bring it within the sheepfold of the written
Constitution. The second alternative was adopted in due
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course. Ultimately the doctrine found a home within the
Due Process Clause, "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." The
original significance of the clause was purely procedural nobody should be punished without a trial by jury or "writ
original of the Common Law." In the revamped clause the
term "due process of law" simply fades out and the clause
comes to read, in effect, "no person shall be deprived of
property, period." Thus was the narrow interpretation
which was planted on the Ex Post Facto Clause in Calder
v. Bull revenged in kind.4 6
This achievement was consummated in the famous case
of Wynehamer v. People,47 in which, in 1856, the New York
Court of Appeals set aside a state-wide prohibition law as
comprising, with regard to liquors in existence at the time
of its going into effect, an act of destruction of property not
within the power of government to perform "even by the
forms of due process of law." An interesting feature of Judge
Comstock's opinion in the case is his repudiation of all arguments against the statute sounding in Natural Law concepts, like "fundamental principles of liberty," "common
reason and natural rights," and so forth. Such theories said
he - squinting, one suspects, at the anti-slavery agitation
- were subversive of the necessary povers of government.
Furthermore, there was "no process of reasoning by which
it could be demonstrated that the 'Act for the Prevention
of Intemperance, Pauperism and Crime' is void, upon principles and theories outside the Constitution, which will not
also, and by an easier induction, bring itin direct conflict
with the Constitution itself." 48
The expansion of the Obligation of Contracts Clause of
Article I, section 10, by resort to Natural Law concepts follows a similar, though briefer course. The master craftsman
46
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was Chief Justice Marshall, and this time the infusion of
the constitutional clause with Natural Law concepts was
direct. The great leading case was Fletcher v. Peck,4 9 in
which, in 1810, Marshall, speaking for the Court, held that
a state legislature was forbidden "either by general principles, which are common to our free institutions, or by
the particular provisions of the constitution of the United
States" " to rescind a previous land grant; while Justice
Johnson based his concurring opinion altogether "on the
reason and nature of things; a principle which will impose
laws even on the Deity." 51 It is true that when, in 1819, the
doctrine of Fletcher v. Peck was extended to the charters of
eleemosynary corporations, the Court contented itself with
invoking only the Obligations Clause.5 2 The dependence,
however, of the holding on Natural Law premises still remains. The constitutional clause presupposes a pre-existent
obligation to be protected. Whence, if not from Natural Law,
can such an obligation descend upon a public grant?
Of -the four great doctrines of American Constitutional
Law which the American judiciary developed prior to the
Civil War, three ('the doctrine of judicial review, the substantive doctrine of due process of law, and the doctrine
that the Obligation of Contracts Clause protects public contracts) are products of the infusion of the documentary Constitution with Natural Law, natural rights concepts. The
fourth doctrine, that of dual federalism, was the creation of
the Supreme Court at Washington under the presidency and
guidance of Chief Justice Taney. It, of course, rests~on different, highly political considerations. Yet even in this case,
Natural Law may claim some credit if, as Thomas Hill
5 3 the
Green argues in his Principles of Political Obligation,
notion of sovereignty is also, in final analysis, rooted in the
6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162 (1810).
Id., 6 Cranch at 139.
51 Id., 6 Cranch at 143.
52 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819).
53 GREEN, PINCILES oF Pouxcm OBLIGATION (1901).
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doctrine of Natural Law. Green, of course, was thinking of
"sovereignty" as it is known to Western political thought,
not the kind of sovereignty that is the offspring of Byzantine
absolutism married to Marxian materialism.
IV.
The Bench And Bar Present Us With An Up-To-Date
Doctrine Of Natural Law
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the
Constitution. The first section of it reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The fifth and final section gave Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
Article."
In the understanding of most people at the time, the intended beneficiaries of the Amendment were the recently
emancipated freedmen, but in the very first cases to reach
the Supreme Court under it, the famous Slaughter House
Cases "'of 1873, this assumption was sharply challenged by
counsel, John Archibald Campbell of New Orleans, a former Justice of ,the Court. No doubt, Campbell argued, the
freedmen would and should derive benefit from the Amendment, but their doing so would only be incidental to the
realization of its much broader purpose, that of giving legal
embodiment to the principle of "laissez-faire individualism
which had been held by the colonists ever since they came
to this soil."55 "What," he asked, "did the colonists and
54
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their posterity seek for and obtain by their settlement of
this continent... ? Freedom, free action, free enterprisefree competition. It was in freedom they expected to find
the best auspices for every kind of human success." "
Campbell lost his suit, by the narrow margin of five Justices to four; but he had sown an idea which, in the course
of the next thirty years, imparted to judicial review a new
and revolutionary extension. In 1878, the American Bar
Association was founded from the elite of the American Bar.
Organized as it was in the wake of the "barbarous" decision
as one member termed it - in Munn v. Illinois,5 7 in
which 'the Supreme Court had held that states were entitled
by virtue of their police power to prescribe the charges of
"businesses affeoted with a public interest," the Association, -through its more eminent members, became the mouthpiece of a new constitutional philosophy which was compounded in about equal parts from the teachings of the
British Manchester School of Political Economy and Herbert Spencer's highly sentimentalized version of the doctrine
of evolution, just then becoming the intellectual vogue; plus
a "booster" - in the chemical sense - from Sir Henry
Maine's Ancient Law, first published in 1861. I refer to
Maine's famous dictum that "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract." 11 If hitherto, why not henceforth?
In short, the American people were presented a new doctrine of Natural Law, the content and purport of which appear - to take a specific example - in Professor William
Graham Sumner's What Social Classes Owe to Each.Other,
which was published in 1883. I quote a passage or two: 5 9
A society based on contract is a society of free and independent men, who form ties without favor or obligation,
and cooperate without cringing or intrigues. A society based
56 Id. at 54, quoting Campbell's Brief, pp. 42-4. Emphasis supplied.
57 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
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on contract, therefore, gives the utmost room and chance for
individual development, and for all the self-reliance and dignity of a free man. . . It follows that one man, in a free state,
cannot claim help from, and cannot be charged to give help
to, another.
And again:
All institutions are to be tested by the degree to which
they guarantee liberty. It is not to be admitted for a moment
that liberty is a means to social ends, and that it may be impaired for major considerations. Any one who so argues has
lost the bearing and relations of all the facts and factors in a
free state. He is a centre of powers to work, and of capacities
to suffer. What his powers may be- whether they can carry
him far or not; what his chances may be, whether wide or
restricted; what his fortune may be, whether to suffer much
or little - are questions of his personal destiny which he
must work out and endure as he can; but for all that concerns the bearing of the society and its institutions upon that
man, and upon the sum of happiness to which he can attain
during his life on earth, the product of all history and all
philosophy up to this time is summed up in the doctrine,
that he should be left free to do the most for himself that he
can, and should be guaranteed the exclusive enjoyment of all
that he does . . . Social improvement is not to be won by

direct effort. It is secondary and results from physical or
economic improvement . . . An improvement in surgical in-

struments or in anesthetics really does more for those who are
not well off than all the declamations of the orators and
pious wishes of the reformers... The yearning after equality
is the offspring of envy and covetousness, and there is no possible plan for satisfying that yearning which can do aught
else than rob A to give to B; consequently all such plans
nourish some of the meanest vices of human nature, waste
capital, and overthrow civilization ...

It is interesting to compare this new type of Natural
Law, and its tremendous exaltation of individual effort,
with the ancient type, which was set forth in the texts quoted
in Section I of this paper. There are two differences, the
first of which approximates that between a moral code,
addressed to the Reason, and "Natural Law" in the sense in
which that term is employed by the natural sciences. The
former operates through men; the latter upon men, and altogether independently of their attitude toward it, or even
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of their awareness of its existence. The results of its operation would therefore be of no moral significance, except for
one circumstance, the assumption, to wit, that compliance
with it - whether conscious or unconscious - forwarded
Progress. Thus, according to Maine, it was "the progressive
societies" which had heretofore moved from status to contract; while with Spencer progressive societies were destined
to "evolve" from the military state into the industrialsociety - a process not yet completed, however, or the State
would have vamished. In short, -the laissez-faire version of
Natural Law contrived, in the end, to combine the moral
prestige of the older concept with the scientific prestige of
the newer."
The second difference can be put more briefly, although
it is perhaps the more important one. The Natural Law of
Cicero, of St. Thomas, Grotius - even of Locke - always
conceives of man as in society. The Natural Law of Spencer,
Sumner, et al., sets man, the supreme product of a highly
competitive struggle for existence, above society - an impossible station in both logic and fact.
The chief constitutional law precipitate from the new
Natural Law, the doctrine of freedom of contract, confirms
and illustrates -this fatal characteristic of it. By this doctrine, persons sui jurisengaged -inthe ordinary employments
were entitled to contract regarding their services without
interference from government; as reciprocally were those
who sought their services. Endorsed by such writers as
Cooley, Tiedemann, James Coolidge Carter, J. F. Dillon,
and by a growing procession of state high courts headed by
those of New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Illinois, the doctrine attained culminating expression in 1905
in the famous Bakeshop Case.6 1 There a New York statute
which limited the hours of labor in bakeries to ten hours a
60
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day and sixty hours a week was set aside five justices to
four as not "a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of
the police power of the state" but "an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty.... 262
How was this result reached? Very simply: it was the
automatic result of the conception of an area of individual
action any interference with which by the state put upon it
a burden of justification not required in other cases. On this
basis the Court came to operate a kind of "automatic" judicial review, the product of which was labelled by its critics
"mechanical jurisprudence." Nor is this type of jurisprudence extinct today, as"I shall now point out. Its application
has merely been transferred to a different set of values and
interests.
V.
Natural Law and Constitutional Law Today
In 1925, in the now famous Gitlow case, 63 which involved
a conviction under the New York Anti-Syndicalist Act, the
Supreme Court adopted tentatively the thesis, which it had
rejected earlier, 'that -the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment adopts and makes effective against state legislatures the limitations which the First Amendment imposes
upon Congress in favor of "freedom of speech and press."
Then in 1940 in the Cantwell case,6 4 the Court upset a conviotion under Connecticut law of two Jehovah's Witnesses
for breach of the peace on the ground that the proselyting activities of the said Witnesses did not under the circumstances
constitute a "clear and present danger" to public order; and
since then a majority of 'the Court has gone to the verge, at
least, of making the "clear and present danger" formula a
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direct test of legislation, although in the Gitlow case it had
rejected the rule as spurious.
And what has all this to do with Natural Law? The answer is discovered when we note the rule by which the
Court professes to be guided when interpreting the word
"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment in the light of the
Bill of Rights. Not all the provisions of the latter are regarded as having been converted by the Fourteenth Amendment -into restrictions on the states, but only those that are
protective of the "immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of free government"; of -the"fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions"; of the "immunities
... implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"; of principles
of justice "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people"; principles, the violation of which would be "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." "
This is entirely in line with the Natural Law tradition.
But does it suffice to elevate the rights it deals with into a
super-constitution, so that any law touching them is ipso
facto "infected with presumptive invalidity"? As we have
seen, this is precisely what happened in -the case of "liberty
of contract"; and today, "liberty of contract" thus distended "is all," as they say in Pennsylvania; and may not a like
fate overtake freedom of speech, press, and religion in time
if the same slide-rule methods are applied to legislation
touching them? I am thinking especially of such decisions
as 'those in Saia v. New York,"0 McCollum v. Board of Education, 7 and Terminiello v. City of Chicago. 8 These were
65 Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 470-72, 67 S. Ct. 374, 91 L. Ed. 422
(1947), quoting from Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389, 18 S. Ct. 383, 42 Y.
Ed. 780 (1898); Hebert v. Lousiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316, 47 S. Ct. 103, 71 L. Ed.
270 (1926); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed.
288 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed.
674 (1934).
66 334 U. S. 558, 68 S. Ct. 1148, 92 L. Ed. 1574 (1948).
67 333 U. S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
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very ill-considered decisions to my way of thinking, and in
fact the first of these has already been repudiated by the
Court,6 9 at least four of the five Justices who were responsible for it lugubriously so assert. I contend, in short, that'
any patent formula or device which relieves the Justices
from considering relevant, however recalcitrant facts, or
which exonerates them of -the characteristic judicial duty of
adjusting the universal and eternal to the local and contingent, the here and the now, is to be deplored.
I contend
further that the "clear and present danger" rule is just such
a patent formula.

How are we to assess the importance of the Natural Law
concept in the development of American Constitutional
Law? What it all simmers down to is essentially this: while
that distinctive American institution, judicial review, is regarded ,today -as stemming from the principle of popular
sovereignty, it sprang in the first instance from "common
right and reason," the equivalent with men of law in the Sixteenth Century England of "Natural Law." What is more,
popular sovereignty in the last analysis is itself a derivative
from the Natural Law postulate, being neither more nor less
than a sort of ad hoc consolidation of the natural right of
human beings to choose their own governing institutions.
And the indebtedness of American Constitutional Law to
Natural Law, natural rights concepts for its content in the
field of private rights is vital and well-nigh all-comprehensive. It is, of course, true that not all of the corollaries that
the courts have endeavored to attach to their premises have
survived; and few have survived without modification. Yet
it is a striking fact that while 'hundreds of constitutional
provisions have been adopted since judicial review was established, not one has ever proposed its abolition and only
very few its modification. And meantime the American
69
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states have continued to incorporate in their successive constitutions, virtually without comment, the constitutional
clauses - the Due Process Clause, for example - that today incorporate the principal judicial doctrines which I have
traced to Natural Law bases. R is true, as I just remarked,
that some of these doctrines have become extinct and others
have been qualified; but invariably these results have been
achieved by judicial massage, as it were - sometimes a
rather rugged massage - and not by legislative or constitutional surgery.
Not that the doctrine of Natural Law itself has escaped
disturbing comment at times, even from American jurists.
Frequently cited in this c6nnection is the late Justice Holmes'
discourse on "Natural Law." "It is not enough," said Justice
Holmes in a characteristic passage, "for the knight of romance that you agree that his lady is a very nice girl, - if
you do not admit that she is the best that God ever made,
you must fight"; and the same demand, he opines, "is at the
bottom of the jurist's search for criteria of absolute valid70

ity.

We can readily concede that such criteria may never be
established in this far from perfedt, and always changing
world. Yet that admission does not necessarily discredit the
search; perhaps, indeed, it makes it more necessary, as an
alternative to despair. Holmes, in fact, exposes himself when
he goes on to advance as an argument against Natural
Law that the right to life "is sacrificed without a scruple
whenever the interest of society, that is, of the predominant
power of the community, is thought to demand it." 1 But
the answer is plain: The right to life is more than the right
to live - it is also the right to spend life for worthwhile
ends; and so long as one is guaranteed a free man's part in
determining whaJt these ends are, Natural Law has pro tanto
received institutional recognition and embodiment. But, of
HoLayS, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310 (Laski ed. 1920).
71 Id. at 314.
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course, it is essential to this argument that the free man's
part be kept a really vital one.
Our present interest, however, has been in Natural Law
as a challenge to the notion of unlimited human authority.
American Constitutional Law is the record of an attempt to
implement that challenge. The record is a somewhat mixed
one, but it is clear that in the judgment of the American
people it has been on the whole a record of success. May it
continue to be!
Edward S. Corwin

